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COMMENTS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF CONTAINERS FOUND IN
AUTOMOBILES: THE SUPREME COURT STRUGGLES FOR A
"BRIGHT LINE" RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court have added
a new dimension to the law of search and seizure of automobiles and con-
tainers found within motor vehicles.* The plurality opinion in Robbins v.
California' held that a closed opaque container found in the luggage com-
partment2 of a station wagon during the course of a lawful vehicle search
could not be seized without a warrant.3 However, in New York v. Belton,
4
a majority held that a police officer, incident to a lawful custodial arrest
of an occupant of an automobile, may search the passenger compartment
of that automobile and examine contents of any containers,5 open or
closed, found therein.
The law governing search and seizure of automobiles and the contain-
ers found within them is extremely confusing,6 and several Justices have
expressed great dissatisfaction with the lack of clarity in the Court's deci-
* The Supreme Court's most recent decision in United States v. Ross is discussed in the
Addendum to this article.
1. 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981). Justice Stewart wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices
Brennan, White and Marshall. The Chief Justice and Justice Powell concurred in the judg-
ment. Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens dissented, each writing separate opinions.
2. While the evidence in Robbins was seized from the luggage compartment, the holding
appears sufficiently broad to apply to any opaque closed container, regardless of its location
in the vehicle. Id. at 2847.
3. Id.
4. 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). Justice Stewart also delivered the opinion of the Court in this
companion case to Robbins and was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist also filed a concurring statement. Justice Stevens
wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice White also wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Marshall joined.
5. Id. at 2864. The Belton decision applies to containers as well as to any other container-
like object located within the passenger compartment. A container is any object capable of
holding another object and includes glove compartments, consoles, luggage, boxes, bags,
clothing, etc. The court's holding applies only to the interior of the passenger compartment
and does not extend to the trunk. Id. at 2864 n.4.
6. One commentator notes that "[flew areas of search and seizure law are more confused
than automobile stops and searches." 1 W. RmGEL, SEARcHEs & SEmZuRS, ARnasrs AND
CONFESSIONS § 11.1 (2d ed. 1981).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
sions in this area.7 While the search and seizure of containers found in-
side automobiles involves considerations separate from the doctrines gov-
erning general automobile searches and seizures,8 it would be impossible
to discuss adequately the "container" cases without examining the
requirements for warrantless searches of vehicles in general. Conse-
quently, this comment will begin by briefly examining the extent to which
automobiles are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures under
the fourth amendment.9
The Supreme Court has held that automobiles are protected under the
fourth amendment as "effects."' 10 This statement is somewhat misleading,
however, since the Court's decisions have also stated that it is not the
place or thing being searched that produces fourth amendment protec-
tion. Rather, the test is whether the challenger to a search has a "reason-
able expectation of privacy" in the area or item being searched." The
Supreme Court has concluded that there is a lesser, or diminished, expec-
tation of privacy in an automobile as compared with one's home or
office. 2
7. Justice Rehnquist, in addressing the issue of warrantless searches and seizures of
automobiles, stated: "This branch of the law is something less than a seamless web." Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973). Compare Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974)
(plurality opinion) with Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 768 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). All cases
in this area reflect a deeply divided Court.
8. The Supreme Court has distinguished searches and seizures of closed containers found
in lawfully stopped automobiles from the general search of a vehicle's interior. See, e.g.,
Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981) (closed opaque container found by police dur-
ing lawful search of vehicle may not be searched without warrant); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979) (warrantless search of personal luggage in lawfully stopped vehicle not valid
under automobile exception); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (footlocker
search not justified under either automobile exception or search incident to arrest
exception).
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
10. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
439 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
11. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967). In Katz the Supreme Court aban-
doned the "protected places" approach, which almost always limited fourth amendment
protection to private property owned by the individual who was the subject of the search.
Instead, the Court emphasized a subjective concept of privacy expressed in the now famous
phrase "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id. at 351. Thus, determining
whether an individual is entitled to fourth amendment protection in a particular situation
now depends upon whether he is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
searched.
12. Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 (1981); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1973); Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967); Carroll v. United
[Vol. 16:649
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In Katz v. United States,' the Court read into the fourth amendment
the so-called "warrant requirement," stating that "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magis-
trate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."'14
Evidence seized by law enforcement officers without a warrant and not
within an exception to the warrant requirement is, therefore, illegally ob-
tained and, as such, is inadmissible at trial.15
Some commentators view the Supreme Court's relaxation of fourth
amendment protection in automobile search cases as a response to the
stringency of the warrant requirement and the exclusionary rule in crimi-
nal prosecutions. 6 Whether this is the case or not, the Court appears to
be searching for a "bright line" rule-pragmatic guidelines that law en-
forcement officers and courts can apply in determining the need for a
warrant. 7 This comment discusses the Supreme Court's search for a
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Id. at 357. Whether the exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few" is debatable.
One author has catalogued more than 15 established exceptions to the warrant requirement.
See Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause,
68 J. CRi. L.C. & P.S. 198, 199 (1977).
The generally recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement are:
(1) search incident to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
(2) hot pursuit; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967);
(3) stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
(4) plain view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971);
(5) consent searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); and
(6) automobile searches, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (mobility
plus probable cause); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory).
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule). '
16. The debate over construction of the fourth amendment continues. Prior to Katz, the
Supreme Court held that a search reasonable under the "totality of circumstances" was
constitutional, regardless of whether a warrant was first obtained. United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56, 63-66 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
Justice Rehnquist has criticized the Court's emphasis of the "warrant requirement" over the
"reasonableness" of the search, claiming that the Court has "'stood the fourth amendment
on its head' from a historical viewpoint." Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1981)
(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971)) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In Robbins, Rehnquist also revived Justice Harlan's attack on the exclusionary rule. Cit-
ing Harlan's criticism in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971), Rehn-
quist urged an end to the rule. 101 S. Ct. at 2851-52. One author's explanation for the
broadening of the automobile exception is the Court's desire to mitigate the "devastating
social effect of the exclusionary rule." Note, The Automobile Exception to the Warrant
Requirement: Speeding Away From the Fourth Amendment, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 637, 638
(1980).
17. Both the Robbins and Belton opinions refer to a "bright line" rule in automobile
search cases. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 n.1, 2848 (1981) (Powell,
J., concurring); New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2866 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart revealed the need for a "bright line" rule when he observed:
1982]
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"bright line" rule by briefly examining the law governing automobile
searches and the various exceptions to the warrant requirement which
permit warrantless vehicle searches. The remainder of the comment will
focus on searches of containers found in automobiles during the course of
a lawful search.
II. THE LAW GOVERNING SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF AUTOMOBILES
The United States Supreme Court first considered the issues surround-
ing a warrantless automobile search in the prohibition-era case of Carroll
v. United States.1 s The Court upheld the validity of a warrantless vehicle
search conducted by federal prohibition agents, who suspected the occu-
pants of transporting illegal liquor in violation of the National Prohibi-
tion Act.19 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority,20 noted the time-
honored distinction 21 between searches of dwellings and searches of mo-
bile vehicles:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the begmining of
the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official
warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon
or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or ju-
risdiction in which the warrant must be sought.2 2
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is pri-
marily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to
be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the
law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisti-
cated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the draw-
ing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon
which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be "literally
impossible of application by the officer in the field."
New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2863 (quoting LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" ver-
sus "Standardized Procedures". The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 141).
18. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
19. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, § 26, 41 Stat. 315 (1919) (repealed in 1933 by U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI). The defendants were apparently caught while making a liquor run
between Detroit and Grand Rapids. Detroit, not far from the Canadian border, was a well
known center for illegal liquor traffic. The liquor was hidden behind the upholstering of the
seats. 267 U.S. at 134-36.
20. Justice McReynolds, joined by Justice Sutherland, dissented, arguing that the defen-
dants should have been arrested prior to the warrantless vehicle search. 267 U.S. at 163-75.
21. The distinction between searches of dwellings and searches of automobiles has found
its way into many of the Court's post-Carroll decisions. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 761 (1979); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589-91 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970); Dyke v. Tay-
lor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59
(1967).
22. 267 U.S. at 153.
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The distinction appeared to be based upon the vehicle's mobility, an exi-
gent circumstance not associated with searches of dwellings.
Thus, the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement was es-
tablished. The Court held that a warrantless vehicle search was permissi-
ble where the government could show: (1) that probable cause for the
search existed;23 (2) that the vehicle was actually mobile and could have
been "quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the war-
rant must be sought; 2 4 and (3) that it was not "reasonably practicable"
to obtain a warrant under the circumstances.25 A plain reading of the
Carroll opinion suggests that the "automobile exception" to the warrant
requirement was a narrow one.
No modification of the Carroll doctrine occurred until 1970, when the
Court decided Chambers v. Maroney.26 In Chambers, the Court upheld
the validity of a warrantless vehicle search and took the "automobile ex-
ception" on a detour from the route charted in Carroll. Justice White,
writing for the majority,27 departed substantially from the three-fold test
enunciated in Carroll by eliminating the requirement that procurement
of a warrant be impracticable. s In Chambers, the vehicle and its occu-
23. Id. at 149.
24. Id. at 153.
25. "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used
.. ." Id. at 156.
26. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Prior to Chambers, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding in
Carroll without modification three times. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); and Husty v. United States, 282 U.S.
694 (1931). However, prior to the Court's ruling in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(search incident to arrest limited to area within immediate control of arrestee), it seemed
possible for an officer to search a car incident to an arrest of its occupant because he was
authorized to search the area where the arrest was made. See, e.g., United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). But see Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (search of vehicle at place and time other than at arrest
too remote and not incident to arrest). Notwithstanding Chimel's limitations on the scope of
a vehicle search incident to the arrest of its occupants, an officer can now search the passen-
ger compartment of an automobile as incident to the custodial arrest of its occupants, even
though the occupants are removed from the vehicle when the search is conducted. See New
York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). See also notes 133-51 infra and accompanying text.
27. Justice Blackmun did not participate in the decision; Justice Harlan dissented in part
and concurred in part. Justice Stewart wrote a brief concurring opinion. 399 U.S. at 54-55.
28. Writing for the majority, Justice White declared:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the immobiliza-
tion of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably only
the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the "greater." But
which is the "greater" and which the "lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question
and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional pur-
poses, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying
out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either
course is reasonable under the Fouth Amendment.
1982]
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pants were in police custody prior to the warrantless search of the auto-
mobile,29 and there were no mobility problems or exigent circumstances
to make obtaining a warrant impracticable. The holding in Chambers
seems merely to require probable cause to justify a warrantless vehicle
search. The Court found that the vehicle's attribute of "mobility" per-
sists, even when the vehicle is taken into custody at the police station. 0
This "inherent mobility"3 1 of the vehicle, coupled with the probable cause
to believe it contained contraband or fruits of crime, was deemed suffi-
cient to eliminate the warrant requirement.
During the Term after Chambers was decided, the Supreme Court once
again considered the requirements for a lawful vehicle search. In Coolidge
v. New Hampshire32 the Court invalidated a post-arrest search of an au-
tomobile parked in a private driveway where the police had probable
cause to search it for weeks prior to the actual search.33 Following the
defendant's arrest, police towed the car from the accused's private drive-
way to the police station where it was searched two days later.34 In a plu-
rality opinion written by Justice Stewart,3 5 the Court seemed to reaffirm
the Carroll requirement of "actual mobility," emphasizing that a particu-
larized showing of exigent circumstances was necessary to justify the war-
rantless vehicle search. The majority concluded that there were no such
Id. at 51-52.
29. The occupants were arrested and their vehicle was taken to the police station, where
it was searched without a warrant. Evidence of a recent robbery was recovered. Id. at 44.
30. Since the police had probable cause to search the vehicle at the time it was stopped
and the occupants arrested, and because the vehicle was "mobile" at the time of the stop,
both the probable cause and mobility factors were still present when the vehicle and occu-
pants were in custody at the police station. Id. at 52.
31. "Inherent mobility," as the Court in Chambers applied the concept, meant the vehi-
cle's capability of being moved, even though the vehicle was in police custody and not actu-
ally mobile. See note 30 supra.
32. 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
33. In Coolidge, the police had obtained both an arrest warrant and a search warrant for
the vehicle, but these were subsequently declared invalid because they had been issued by
the State Attorney General, rather than by a neutral and detached magistrate. Id. at 449. As
a result, the government was forced to argue the case as an exception to the warrant
requirement.
34. Id. at 447-48.
35. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and Harlan joined Justice Stewart in Part I of
the opinion, declaring the warrants invalid because they were not issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate. The same Justices also agreed in Part IIA that the search could not be
justified as incident to arrest. Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall agreed in
part IIB that the search was not valid under the "automobile exception" because the mobil-
ity factor was missing and it was practicable for the police to obtain a warrant prior to the
search. In Part IIC, the same four Justices held that the "plain view" doctrine did not ap-
ply. Justice Harlan joined them once again in Part IID, holding that no exigent circum-
stances exist where the police planned the vehicle search well in advance. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Black, Blackmun and White all filed separate dissenting opinions in
this fragmented decision.
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exigent circumstances present in Coolidge.6 Thus, it appeared that the
Court would insist on "actual mobility" pursuant to Carroll rather than
the "inherent mobility" standard announced in Chambers when deter-
mining the validity of warrantless vehicle searches.3 7 Also, Coolidge
seemed to reemphasize the Carroll mandate that a warrant should be ob-
tained where reasonably practicable.3 8
The revival of the Carroll automobile exception was ephemeral, how-
ever, in light of the Court's decision in Cardwell v. Lewis9 three years
later. In Cardwell, the Court held that no violation of the defendant's
fourth amendment rights resulted from a warrantless seizure of his auto-
mobile and the examination of its exterior at a police impoundment lot
following the vehicle's removal from a public parking lot.40 The plurality
opinion, written by Justice Blackmun,41 noted the lower degree of fourth
amendment protection afforded automobiles as compared to dwellings
due to the exigent circumstances associated with mobile vehicles,42 adding
that the lesser expectation of privacy in motor vehicles as opposed to
dwellings permits less stringent warrant requirements in an automobile
search case.'3 The search of the exterior of the car, according to the
Court, was never actually a search at all within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Even if it had been such a search, there was no infringement
of defendant's expectation of privacy because the exterior of a vehicle was
exposed to public view." The seizure of the car was also valid and no
warrant was necessary because the defendant's family might have been
able to remove the vehicle before a warrant could have been obtained. 5
36. 403 U.S. at 462.
37. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion rejected the concept of "inherent mobility" as a
justification for a warrantless search based on probable cause:
In this case, it is, of course, true that even though Coolidge was in jail, his wife was
miles away in the company of two plainclothesmen, and the Coolidge property was
under the guard of two other officers, the automobile was in a literal sense "mobile."
A person who had the keys and could slip by the guard could drive it away. We
attach no constitutional significance to this sort of mobility.
Id. at 461 n.18.
38. Id. at 462.
39. 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion).
40. Id. at 585.
41. Justice Blackmun was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White and Rehnquist.
Id.
42. Id. at 589-90.
43. The Court stated:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thor-
oughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.
Id. at 590.
44. Id. at 591-92.
45. The Court referred to evidence presented in the lower court that Lewis had asked one
of his attorneys to see that a family member retrieved the car. The threat to police custody
19821
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Whether "actual mobility" was present in Cardwell is debatable.4 The
case could have been easily decided solely on the basis of the "plain view"
doctrine 47 but the plurality in Cardwell chose to treat it as an "automo-
bile exception" case, broadening the exception by reviving the Chambers
standards.4s
The Chambers-Cardwell position marks the Supreme Court's shift
from a probable cause plus exigent circumstances test (mobility plus im-
practicability of obtaining a warrant) to a probable cause plus a "lesser
expectation of privacy" test.49 Under the latter test, the concept of "mo-
bility" is nothing more than a permanent attribute of the vehicle, regard-
less of the factual circumstances under which the car is searched. Not
only is this shift a major distortion of the Carroll doctrine, but it is also
inconsistent with the Court's well settled principle that an exigency must
be present at the time of the search in order to justify an exception to the
warrant requirement.50
The Court has also enlarged law enforcement powers by validating be-
nign purpose or non-investigatory warrantless searches of automobiles
where probable cause to search the vehicle is absent. In Cady v. Dom-
browski,51 in a five-to-four decision52 the Court upheld a non-investiga-
tory warrantless search of a vehicle in police custody. The defendant in
that case was arrested for drunk driving after having a single car accident
of the vehicle was fleeting, however, since the attorney gave the car keys to the police in
order to avoid a physical confrontation. Id. at 595.
46. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, dissenting, argued
that the Carroll doctrine required a moving vehicle to justify a warrantless search, and that
the "automobile exception" did not apply to the search and seizure of a vehicle securely
within police custody. The dissent indicated that both the defendant, Lewis, and the keys to
his car were secured by the police well before the car was seized from the public lot and
there was no likelihood that Lewis or anyone else could have meddled with the vehicle dur-
ing the time necessary to obtain a warrant. Id. at 598 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
47. The Cardwell vehicle was parked on a public lot where seizure would not require an
entry onto private property as was required in Coolidge. Id. at 593. In contrast to the exten-
sive search of the interior involved in Coolidge, the search of the Cardwell vehicle was lim-
ited to an exterior examination of a tire tread and the taking of paint samples. Id. at 593
n.9.
48. The plurality opinion relied on the principle enunciated in Chambers that there was
no difference between temporary seizure of a vehicle for the time necessary to obtain a
warrant and an immediate warrantless search on the spot because the "mobility" of the
vehicle remained, even when the vehicle and its occupant were under police custody. Id. at
593-94.
49. Accord, Note, supra note 16, at 649; Comment, The Automobile Exception: A Con-
tradiction in Fourth Amendment Principles, 17 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 933, 944-45 (1980).
50. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 461 n.18; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at
61-63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
51. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
52. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White,
Blackmun and Powell. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Douglas, Stewart and
Marshall. Id. at 434.
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in his vehicle. The police learned that the defendant was an off-duty Chi-
cago policeman who was required to keep a service revolver with him at
all times. After a cursory search of the defendant's person and the car,
the pistol could not be found. The defendant's disabled vehicle was sub-
sequently towed to a private garage where an officer searched the locked
trunk in an attempt to find the missing revolver. Instead, he discovered
evidence linking the defendant to a murder. The Court held the warrant-
less search lawful on the grounds that the police were simply exercising a
"community caretaking function" by removing the disabled vehicle from
the accident scene,53 and that the search of the trunk to remove the re-
volver was standard police procedure "to protect the public from the pos-
sibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious
hands."5' The majority in Dombrowski rejected the possibility that the
"general public safety" concern was a pretext for a full scale investigative
search55 and characterized the search as non-criminal in nature.58
Benign purpose searches, which are characterized by an absence of
probable cause and are purportedly non-investigatory, also include auto-
mobile inventory searches. Police typically inventory the contents of an
automobile once it has been impounded. 57 In South Dakota v. Opper-
53. The majority determined that automobiles are less protected than dwellings or homes
under the fourth amendment because of the substantial non-criminal contacts that police
have with automobiles:
Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also because of
the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in an accident on
public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be
substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office.
Id. at 441. In addition, the opinion stated that police activities such as accident investiga-
tions are usually non-criminal in nature so that the police are normally executing "commu-
nity caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition
of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Id. In this instance the defen-
dant, Dombrowski, because of his intoxicated state, was not able to make arrangements to
have the vehicle towed. Id. at 443.
54. Id.
55. The investigating officer had no knowledge that a crime had been committed at the
time the search was conducted. Id. at 447.
56. The search was purportedly occasioned by the officers' concern that the defendant's
service revolver could have been stolen from the vehicle while it was at the private garage.
See notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
57. Police take vehicles into custody for various reasons. E.g., Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967) (warrantless search of a vehicle legitimately seized pursuant to forfeiture
statute upheld). State statutes authorize vehicle forfeiture under numerous circumstances.
See, e.g., VA. CoDn ANN. §§ 4-53 to -56 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (transportation of illicit alcoholic
beverages); §§ 46.1-191.2, -351.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1981) (racing on the high-
way); § 18.2-249 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (narcotics); and § 18.2-110 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (transporta-
tion of stolen goods). Other statutes may authorize temporary impoundment in a number of
situations. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-2 (unattended, abandoned or immobile vehicles),
-2.1 (vehicles obstructing traffic), -3.02 (outstanding parking violations), -3.1 (vehicles in-
volved in accidents), -248 (vehicle stopped on the highway) (Repl. Vol. 1980). However, VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.1-3 (Repl. Vol. 1980) permits local authorities to regulate impoundment
1982]
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man,"8 the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless inventory search of an
impounded vehicle conducted pursuant to a standard police department
policy. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,59 based the decision
on the inherent mobility of automobiles and the lower expectation of pri-
vacy recognized with regard to the contents of an automobile.6 0 The
Court explained that police and citizens are constantly engaged in non-
criminal contacts with respect to their automobiles and, as in Dombrow-
ski, the police exercise "community caretaking functions" over
automobiles by taking them into custody."' The inventory search, accord-
ing to the majority, serves three important purposes: 1) the protection of
the vehicle owner's property while the vehicle remains in police custody;
2) the protection of police from liability arising out of claims of lost or
stolen property; and 3) the protection of police from potential danger.6 2
The Opperman decision leaves unsettled two important issues regard-
ing inventory searches. First, the decision does not specify under what
conditions an automobile may be legitimately impounded. While the
source of a police officer's authority may be found in state laws and local
ordinances, it is not clear whether the policeman can or should impound
a vehicle for minor traffic violations when the driver is present, does not
consent to the impounding of his vehicle, and is capable of providing for
alternative disposition of the vehicle. Second, Opperman does not define
the permissible scope of the inventory search. While the Court approved
state court decisions holding that inventories may include a search of the
glove compartment," it did not indicate whether a distinction would be
made between locked and unlocked glove compartments.6 5 Nor did the
Court deal with the problem of closed and locked containers found within
the vehicle which could be removed and secured without further exami-
nation by the police.6 6 The lower courts predictably are at variance on all
under local ordinances and standard police procedures. See also Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537
(1973).
58. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
59. Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens joined in the opinion of Chief Jus-
tice Burger. Justice Powell also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Marshall wrote the dis-
sent, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart. Justice White filed a brief separate dissent.
60. 428 U.S. at 367.
61. Id. at 368 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973)). See note 53 supra
and accompanying text.
62. 428 U.S. at 369.
63. See note 57 supra.
64. 428 U.S. at 372.
65. Arguably, when the vehicle's glove compartment is locked, the owner is exhibiting a
greater expectation of privacy with respect to its contents than if he had left the compart-
ment unlocked.
66. Justice Marshall believed that the majority opinion in Opperman did not authorize
the further examination of closed containers which could be safely removed and secured.
428 U.S. at 388 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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three issues.8 The better and more flexible approach to resolving these
problems is to balance the interests served by the inventory search
against the citizen's expectancy of privacy in the contents of his
automobile."
II. SEARCHES OF CONTAINERS FouND WITHIN AUTOMOBILES
The Supreme Court confronted the issue of the police officer's author-
ity to open and search closed containers lawfully seized from an automo-
bile in United States v. Chadwick.9 In a seven-to-two decision,7 0 the
Court invalidated a warrantless footlocker search which produced large
quantities of marijuana.
In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents had advance notice that two
train passengers would arrive in Boston with a footlocker suspected to
contain marijuana.71 The Boston agents set up surveillance at the train
station and ultimately confronted the drug couriers after the footlocker
was loaded into the trunk of Chadwick's car outside the train station.
While the trunk was still open but before the car's engine was started, the
agents arrested Chadwick and the two drug couriers. All three men, the
automobile, and the footlocker were taken into custody. An hour and a
half later, agents broke open the padlocked footlocker revealing a sub-
stantial quantity of marijuana. The Court held that the warrantless
search of the footlocker's contents was invalid, stating unequivocally: "By
placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents
manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from pub-
lic examination .... There being no exigency, it was unreasonable for
the Government to conduct this search without the safeguards a judicial
warrant provides.17
2
The government had contended that the "automobile exception" for
warrantless vehicle searches should apply to luggage seized from the auto-
67. For a survey of the divergent lower court decisions concerning the police's authority
to impound and inventory vehicles and the scope of the inventory search, see 1 W. RiNGEL,
supra note 6, at § 11.4.
68. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Opperman, stated that an inventory
search cannot be an unrestrained search authorizing the police to scrutinize the entire con-
tents of an automobile. Such a search "would constitute a serious intrusion upon the privacy
of the individual in many circumstances." 428 U.S. at 379-80.
69. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
70. Chief Justice Burger delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Brennan,
Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell and Stevens. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent, joined
by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 2.
71. Railroad officials in San Diego, the departure point, discovered talcum powder leaking
from an unusually heavy trunk, and one suspect matched a drug courier profile. This infor-
mation was forwarded to Boston. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 11.
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mobile, since luggage, like the vehicle transporting it, was "mobile."' 7 The
Court rejected this argument, and distinguished the expectation of pri-
vacy in luggage from that in automobiles.
Luggage contents are not open to public view, except as a condition to a
border entry or common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject to regular in-
spections and official scrutiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an automobile,
whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a reposi-
tory of personal effects. In sum, a person's expectations of privacy in per-
sonal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile. 4
The Court did not agree with the government's assertion that the foot-
locker was "mobile" simply because it had been seized from the trunk of
Chadwick's car. To the contrary, the Court found that the footlocker was
"immobilized" because the federal agents had it under their exclusive
control without the "slightest danger that the footlocker or its contents
could have been removed before a valid search warrant could be
obtained. 7
5
The government also had argued that the search of the footlocker was
incident to the arrest of the three men because it was seized contempora-
neously with their arrest and searched relatively soon thereafter .7  The
defect in this argument was two-fold. First, the contents of the double-
locked footlocker were not within the arrestees' immediate control where
they could have gained possession of the marijuana or destroyed it. 7 7 Sec-
ond, while the footlocker was seized contemporaneously with the arrest of
the three men, it was not searched until an hour and a half after the
arrest, so that the search was "'remote in time [and] place from the
arrest.' T78
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, questioned the
majority's distinction between general searches of automobiles and
searches of containers found within the vehicle.7 9 The dissent pointed out
that, under the rule announced in United States v. Robinson,"0 no war-
rant was required for an arresting officer's search of the clothing and per-
73. Id. at 11-12.
74. Id. at 13.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). The Court stated:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and
there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident
of the arrest.
433 U.S. at 15.
78. Id. at 15 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
79. 433 U.S. at 17 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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sonal effects of an individual lawfully under custodial arrest. The author-
ity for the warrantless search, according to Robinson, was the custodial
arrest itself. If the arrest were lawful, so was the search, regardless of
whether evidence or weapons were within the immediate control of the
arrestee so that they could be reached or destroyed.81 The dissent noted
that one year after Robinson was decided, the Court did away with the
"contemporaneous" requirement for the search incident to arrest in
United States v. Edwards8 2 by holding that a warrantless search of an
arrestee's personal effects may be delayed several hours following the ar-
rest where the arrestee remains in lawful custody.83
The dissent argued that the Robinson-Edwards rationales, coupled
with the Chambers "automobile exception," would permit the police to
impound a vehicle upon probable cause and examine its contents without
a warrant and that the police could seize and search "any movable prop-
erty in the possession of a person properly arrested in a public place. '""
Justice Blackmun thus criticized the majority's refusal to include the
footlocker among those personal articles that may be searched incident to
lawful custodial arrest. The fact that a warrant could have been readily
obtained after the federal agents seized the footlocker did not make the
warrantless search of its contents unreasonable according to his view.8
The Supreme Court subsequently refused to extend the "automobile
exception" to a warrantless search of personal luggage seized from a law-
fully stopped vehicle in Arkansas v. Sanders."8 In Sanders, the police,
acting on an informant's "tip," set up surveillance at an airport, awaiting
the arrival of a person suspected of carrying a green suitcase loaded with
marijuana. The police watched the respondent claim a green suitcase
from the airline baggage point and hand it to a companion who placed it
in the trunk of a taxi waiting outside the airport. When the taxi drove
away, the police gave pursuit, stopped the taxi and instructed the driver
to open the trunk of the vehicle. Without the respondent's consent, the
police seized and searched the green suitcase, discovering a significant
quantity of marijuana.
In Sanders the Court confronted "the task of determining whether the
warrantless search of respondent's suitcase [fell] on the Chadwick or the
81. 433 U.S. at 18. The dissent stated that the arresting officer's right to search the custo-
dial arrestee's person was automatic and need not be based on a court's ad hoc determina-
tion of the probability of the officer discovering evidence or weapons on the arrestee's per-
son. See Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
82. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
83. Id. at 807-08.
84. 433 U.S. at 19.
85. Id. at 19.
86. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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Chambers-Carroll side of the Fourth Amendment line. ' '87 In a five-man
majority opinion written by Justice Powell"8 the Court recognized that "a
suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on the highway is not necessa-
rily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with
luggage taken from other locations."89 The mobility of the vehicle does
not attach to the luggage found inside once the police have removed the
luggage and have it safely within their control.90 Therefore, as stated in
Chadwick, "the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the point imme-
diately before the search-after the police have seized the object to be
searched and have it securely within their control."9"
The majority opinion in Sanders viewed suitcases as repositories for
personal effects giving rise to a greater expectation of privacy than the
privacy interests attending automobiles.9 2 The majority emphasized that
not all containers found within an automobile will warrant full protection
under the fourth amendment. Some containers do not manifest an expec-
tation of privacy "because their contents can be inferred from their [the
container's] outward appearance. '' s Finally, the opinion noted that the
administrative burdens accompanying a temporary seizure of an automo-
bile while a warrant is being obtained do not apply to luggage seized from
an automobile.9 '
The dissent insisted, however, that the "automobile exception" applied
to the suitcase search in Sanders because Carroll authorized warrantless
searches of vehicles for "contraband goods concealed and illegally trans-
ported in an automobile. '9 5 According to this view, the majority's distinc-
tion between luggage and various types of containers would lead to mass
confusion.
Suppose a portable luggage-container rack is affixed to the top of the vehi-
cle. Is the arresting officer constitutionally able to open this on the spot, on
the theory that it is like the car's trunk, or must he remove it and take it to
the station for a warrant, on the theory that it is like the 200-pound foot-
locker in Chadwick? Or suppose there is probable cause to arrest persons
seated in the front seat of the automobile, and a suitcase rests on the back
seat. Is that suitcase within the area of immediate control, such that Chad-
87. Id. at 757.
88. Justice Powell wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, White and
Marshall. Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Stevens joined.
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justice Rehnquist.
89. Id. at 764.
90. Id. at 763.
91. Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13).
92. 442 U.S. at 764.
93. Id. at 764-65 n.13. Examples given by Justice Powell include a kit of burglar tools, a
gun case or a transparent package.
94. Id. at 765 n.14.
95. Id. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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wick-Sanders rules do not apply? Or suppose the arresting officer opens the
car's trunk and finds that it contains an array of containers-an orange
crate, a lunch bucket, an attache case, a dufflebag, a cardboard box, a
backpack, a totebag, and a paper bag. Which of these may be searched im-
mediately, and which'are so "personal" that they must be impounded for
future search only pursuant to a warrant?"6
The dissent emphasized that little fourth amendment protection would
be afforded by the Chadwick-Sanders rules in exchange for the difficulty
of their application.9 7 Since there was ample probable cause to believe the
Sanders vehicle was transporting contraband and it was "mobile," the
"bright line" rule would be to authorize an immediate warrantless search
of the luggage believed to contain contraband.98
After Chadwick and Sanders, it appeared that the presumptive war-
rant requirement was strengthened and that the Court was limiting the
expanding "automobile exception," at least as it applied to searches of
luggage and "personal" containers found in automobiles subject to search
and seizure. Support for the Chadwick-Sanders approach to the
"container" cases appears to be weakening, however, in light of the
Court's recent decision in Robbins v. California.99
Robbins invalidated a search of two opaque brick-shaped plastic pack-
ages of marijuana found in the luggage compartment of a station wagon
lawfully stopped on the highway. At the time the vehicle was stopped, the
California Highway Patrolmen did not suspect that it was transporting
marijuana. The petitioner, who had been driving the vehicle, stepped out
and approached the patrol car, whereupon the officers asked for his
driver's license and vehicle registration. When the petitioner went back to
the station wagon to get the registration, he opened the car door and the
officers detected marijuana smoke. Suspicions aroused, the patrolmen did
a "pat down" search of petitioner and discovered a vial of liquid on his
person. They subsequently searched the passenger compartment of the
station wagon and recovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia. After the
petitioner was placed in the patrol car, the officers opened the tailgate of
the station wagon and opened a recessed luggage compartment. Inside the
luggage compartment were two box-shaped packages wrapped in green
96. Id. at 771-72.
97. Id. at 772. The Chief Justice's concurring opinion in Sanders meets the dissent's
argument:
The dissent complains that the Court does not adopt a "clear" rule, presumably one
capable of resolving future Fourth Amendment litigation. This is not cause for la-
ment, however desirable it might be to fashion a universal prescription governing the
myriad Fourth Amendment cases that might arise. We are construing the Constitu-
tion, not writing a statute or a manual for law enforcement officers.
Id. at 768 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
98. Id. at 769 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
99. 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981).
1982] 663
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
opaque plastic. Unwrapping both packages, the police found that each
contained fifteen pounds of marijuana. Based on the evidence thus ob-
tained, the petitioner was charged with various drug offenses. 100
After an unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence, the petitioner
was convicted for various narcotics offenses by a jury. The California
Court of Appeals affirmed. However, on a writ of certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration in
light of Arkansas v. Sanders.101 On remand, the California Court of Ap-
peals again affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court "'could
reasonably [have] conclude[d] that the contents of the packages could
have been inferred from their outward appearance, so that appellant
could not have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
the contents.' "02
Justice Stewart, writing the plurality opinion, 03 held that the search
was invalid, citing the Court's refusal in Chadwick and Sanders to uphold
warrantless searches of closed containers found inside an automobile.,0
The State of California had contended that the packages searched in the
Robbins case were, by their very nature, not the type of containers likely
to hold "personal" effects intended by the owner to remain free from
public scrutiny. Its position was that Chadwick and Sanders did not pro-
hibit the warrantless search of "flimsier" containers like the packages
opened in Robbins. °5
The plurality opinion rejected the government's "sturdy-flimsy" dichot-
omy. First, it stated, the fourth amendment warrant requirement does
not depend upon whether the container may be characterized as holding
"personal" effects as opposed to "impersonal" effects. 06 "The contents of
Chadwick's footlocker and Sander's suitcase were immune from a war-
rantless search because they had been placed within a closed, opaque
container and because Chadwick and Sanders had thereby reasonably
'manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from
public examination.' "107 In addition, even if the Court were to adopt the
government's position that fourth amendment protection depends upon
the nature of the container and the likelihood of its contents being "per-
sonal" as opposed to "impersonal" effects, such a position could not offer
100. Id. at 2842-44.
101. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). For a discussion of the Sanders case, see notes 86-98 supra and
accompanying text.
102. 101 S. Ct. at 2844 (quoting People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App.3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr.
780, 783 (1980)).
103. See note 1 supra.
104. 101 S. Ct. at 2845.
105. Id. at 2845-46.
106. Id. at 2846.
107. Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977).
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any workable guideline to determine what types of containers would more
likely serve as repositories for personal effects.108
The plurality opinion admitted that Sanders did not apply to all con-
tainers found by the police during the course of an automobile search, 09
but asserted that the holding in that case extended protection to closed
containers other than luggage. Exceptions to the rule were noted where
containers, by their nature, betray their contents, so that no reasonable
person could expect the contents to remain private; or where the package
or container leaves its contents open to plain view.110 The Justices joining
in the plurality opinion rejected the California appellate court's conclu-
sion that "'[a]ny experienced observer could have inferred from the ap-
pearance of the packages that they contained bricks of marijuana.' "
Since the bricks of marijuana were wrapped inside a closed, opaque
container, they could not be unwrapppd without a warrant, even though
found during the course of a lawful vehicle search based upon probable
cause.
1 2
Justice Powell, while concurring in the judgment, criticized the plural-
ity for formulating an overbroad, mechanical "bright line" rule. 1 3 The
test adopted by the plurality, he argued, would impose a warrant require-
ment on all searches of closed, opaque containers regardless of the own-
er's reasonable expectation of privacy. 14 Any difficulty in determining the
owner of a container has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect
to the contents did not justify an automatic warrant requirement simply
because the container was closed and opaque.115
Justice Blackmun, in a brief dissent, reiterated his position that the
"automatic exception" to the warrant requirement should be extended to
"container" searches.116 Justice Rehnquist's dissent called for the overrul-
108. Id. at 2846. Justice Stewart noted that "[w]hat one person put into a suitcase, an-
other may put into a paper bag." Id. (citation omitted).
109. Id. (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979)). See note 93 supra
and accompanying text.
110. 101 S. Ct. at 2846.
111. Id. (quoting People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 783
(1980)). The California Court of Appeals concluded that the contents of the packages could
be inferred by the nature of the packaging, based on the arresting officer's testimony that he
had heard that marijuana was often packaged in a way similar to that of the petitioner's
packages. The Robbins plurality found this evidence insufficient to support the appellate
court's conclusion. 101 S. Ct. at 2846-47.
112. 101 S. Ct. at 2847.
113. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 2849.
115. Id. Justice Powell suggested that the ultimate inquiry in each case "is whether one's
claim to privacy from government intrustion is reasonable in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances." Id. (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun agreed, however, with a
great portion of Justice Rehnquist's dissent.
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ing of Mapp v. Ohio,"" suggesting that the confusion surrounding search
and seizure questions could never be eliminated until Mapp v. Ohio was
no longer a part of American jurisprudence. 1 8 In his opinion, also fetter-
ing the Court's ability to formulate "bright line" rules regarding search
and seizure problems was the "presumptive warrant requirement" man-
dated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire."9 Justice Rehnquist believed the
reasonableness of a search should not depend upon whether a warrant
was first obtained, but upon a standard of "reasonableness" considering
all the facts surrounding the search. 20
Since the Court was not prepared to act on Justice Rehnquist's sugges-
tion that the "exclusionary rule" and the "presumptive warrant require-
ment" be abolished, Justice Rehnquist stated he would uphold the Rob-
bins search under the "automobile exception." Justice Rehnquist adopted
Justice Blackmun's position in Arkansas v. Sanders that "[t]he luggage,
like the vehicle transporting it, is mobile."'' Moreover, Justice Rehnquist
stated that "automobiles as a class are inherently mobile" and that "one
need not demonstrate that a particular automobile was capable of being
moved .... 1122
The fact that the police have custody of the automobile and containers
found inside before the search is contemplated would be irrelevant under
this view. Rehnquist also noted that the searching officer in Robbins
could have inferred from the packaging that he had discovered two bricks
of marijuana, so that the Sanders rule did not apply.123 Sanders, he ar-
gued, did not require a warrant to search containers whose "contents can
be inferred from their outward appearance.""124 He pointed to evidence in
the record that during the course of the officer's search of the passenger
compartment of the station wagon, the petitioner stated: "'What you are
looking for is in the back.' ",125 According to Rehnquist, this statement,
coupled with the officer's knowledge that marijuana was packaged in that
particular fashion, provided the officer with a reasonable inference of the
packages' contents."'
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens likewise favored ex-
117. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
118. 101 S. Ct. at 2851-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (citing 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (warrantless searches per se unreasonable, subject to a
few well-established and clearly delineated exceptions)).
120. 101 S. Ct. at 2851-52. See also note 16 supra.
121. 101 S. Ct. at 2853 (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 769 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)).
122. 101 S. Ct. at 2853 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 2854.
124. Id. (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13).
125. 101 S. Ct. at 2854. Justice Rehnquist noted that petitioner's statement was "conspic-




tending the "automobile exception" to permit warrantless searches of
containers found in cars, where the police have probable cause to search
the vehicle. 127 In both Robbins and its companion case, New York v. Bel-
ton,' 2s the automobiles were lawfully stopped, the occupants were law-
fully arrested prior to the vehicle search, and the officers had probable
cause to believe that the vehicles were transporting marijuana.'2 9 There-
fore, according to Stevens, a consistent application of the "automobile ex-
ception" was required to avoid the unnecessary problem, created by
Chadwick and Sanders, of drawing distinctions between various types of
containers."30 Stevens asserted that the whole purpose of the "automobile
exception" was to relieve the police of the burden of obtaining a warrant
prior to a probable cause search of a vehicle on the highway.' 3' Since the
"automobile exception" was, in effect, a substitute for a judicial warrant,
the scope of the search under the exception should not be more restricted
than a search conducted pursuant to a warrant.'3 2
In the companion case of New York v. Belton,'s5 a five-man majority
127. Id. at 2856 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). See note 4 supra.
129. 101 S. Ct. at 2855. The initial stops in both Robbins and Belton were for traffic
violations. Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. at 2843; New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2861.
In both cases, however, the police detected marijuana smoke during the traffic stop, and
recovered marijuana from the passenger compartments of both vehicles during a lawful ve-
hicle search. Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. at 2844; New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. at
2861-62.
130. 101 S. Ct. at 2856 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens agreed with Justice
Blackmun's criticism of Sanders to the extent that Sanders required courts to differentiate
between numerous types of containers. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
131. 101 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens distinguished Robbins
and Belton from Chadwick and Sanders. In the former cases, police had probable cause to
search the vehicles entirely; but in the latter cases, police had probable cause to search only
the footlocker and suitcase, not the vehicles. Id. at 2857 n.9. Therefore, according to Justice
Stevens, Chadwick and Sanders were not "automobile exception" cases but instead were
true "container" cases. Robbins and Belton, though, fell within the "automobile exception."
132. Id. at 2857. Justice Stevens explained:
The scope of any search that is within the exception should be just as broad as a
magistrate could authorize by warrant ifehe were on the scene; the automobile excep-
tion to the warrant requirement therefore justifies neither more nor less than could a
magistrate's warrant. If a magistrate issued a search warrant for an automobile, and
officers conducting the search authorized by the warrant discovered a suitcase in the
car, they surely would not need to return to the magistrate for another warrant before
searching the suitcase.
Id. Justice Stevens applied the same reasoning to searches of containers discovered during
the lawful search of a house pursuant to a warrant-
Similarly, if a magistrate issues a warrant for the search of a house, police executing
that warrant clearly need not obtain a separate warrant for the search of a suitcase
found in the house, so long as the things to be seized could reasonably be found in
such a suitcase.
Id. at 2857 n.8.
133. 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
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opinion"" authored by Justice Stewart upheld a container search during
the course of a lawful search of the vehicle's passenger compartment after
the occupants were placed under custodial arrest. The factual situation
was strikingly similar to that in Robbins. In Belton, a New York state
trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding. After a request to see the driver's
license and the vehicle's registration, the officer discovered that none of
the four occupants was the owner or related to the registered owner of the
vehicle. During this time the officer smelled burnt marijuana and ob-
served in plain view on the car floor an envelope marked "Supergold"
which he associated with marijuana. The officer ordered all four men out
of the car and placed them all under arrest for possession of marijuana.
After a "pat down" search of each occupant, he separated them along the
highway so they could not touch each other or the vehicle. After giving
Miranda warnings to each of the four,18 5 he searched them and the pas-
senger compartment of the car. The officer seized and opened the enve-
lope marked "Supergold" and found it to contain marijuana. During the
course of his search of the passenger compartment, the officer also seized
Belton's black leather jacket from the backseat, unzipped one of the
pockets, and discovered a quantity of cocaine.8s
. Belton was indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled substance,
and after an unsuccessful motion to suppress the cocaine, he pleaded
guilty to a lesser included offense while preserving his fourth amendment
claim that the cocaine was unlawfully seized. The Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court affirmed Belton's conviction, holding that
"[o]nce defendant was validly arrested for possession of marijuana, the
officer was justified in searching the immediate area for other contra-
band.' 3 7 The New York Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that "[a]
warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket may
not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest where there is no
longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might gain access to
the article."" 8 0
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Stewart, recognized that Chimel v. California"9 established that a
lawful custodial arrest justifies the warrantless, contemporaneous search
of the arrestee's person and of the immediately surrounding area where
the arrestee might reach for weapons or conceal or destroy evidence. 140
The Belton majority similarly recognized that United States v. Robin-
134. See note 4 supra.
135. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
136. 101 S. Ct. at 2861-64.
137. People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d 198, 201, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (1979).
138. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 449, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575
(1980).
139. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
140. 101 S. Ct. at 2862 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
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son141 authorized searches incident to lawful custodial arrest without in-
quiries into the exigencies supporting the search. 142 For the first time,
however, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of "whether, in the
course of a search incident to the lawful custodial arrest of the occupants
of an automobile, police may search inside the automobile after the ar-
restees are no longer in it."'
43
The Belton majority determined that a vehicle's passenger compart-
ment fell within the Chimel definition of "the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item."144 Therefore,
the police could, "as a contemporaneous incident to arresting the vehicle's
occupants, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.' 1
45
As a corollary to that finding, the Belton majority declared that "the
police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the
passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach
of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach."'14 The
Court was still faced with the problem that the arrestees in Belton were
outside the vehicle at the time of the search and, therefore, did not have
access to any of the evidence seized from the passenger compartment. By
extending Robinson to the situation in Belton, the Court implied that no
ad hoc judgment was to be made regarding the searching officer's assess-
ment of the probability that the containers were concealing destructible
evidence or weapons and the likelihood of the arrestees gaining possession
or control of the containers."47 The authority of the police to search the
immediate area where the arrestees had been before the search stemmed
solely from the custodial arrest of the vehicle's occupants. 48
The Court distinguished Chadwick and Sanders based on the facts in
Belton. The search of the footlocker in Chadwick was not contemporane-
ous with Chadwick's arrest, having been conducted an hour and a half
later. 49 In Sanders, the Court had not considered the "search incident to
arrest" rationale, since the government had not argued it and because the
suitcase, located in the trunk of the vehicle, was not within the immediate
141. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
142. 101 S. Ct. at 2863. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
143. 101 S. Ct. at 2863.
144. Id. at 2864 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
145. 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
146. Id. Even more expansive, however, is the Belton majority's definition of "container."
See note 5 supra.
147. Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). See note 81 supra
and accompanying text.
148. 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
149. Id. at 2865 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)). Further, the
federal agents in Chadwick had obtained secure, exclusive control over the footlocker as
compared to the tentative custody of the black leather jacket in Belton.
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control of the arrestee. 15° In Belton, however, the jacket was in the pas-
senger compartment of the vehicle, which the arrestees had occupied just
before being taken into custody, and, therefore, was within their immedi-
ate control.151
Justice Rehnquist concurred and joined in the majority opinion, but, as
in Robbins only because of the Court's unwillingness to overrule Mapp
and Coolidge, and because the Court would not uphold the Belton search
under the "automobile exception."'1 52 However, Justice Stevens, in his dis-
senting opinion in Robbins, took issue with the broad "search incident to
arrest" rule fashioned by the Court in Belton.15 3 The Court's new rule in
Belton, he said, would apply to every custodial arrest of a vehicle's occu-
pant, permitting the police to search luggage and other closed containers,
without a warrant and without probable cause.' 5 He criticized Belton's
new "bright line" rule for giving the police wide discretion because an
officer "may find reason to follow that procedure whenever he sees an
interesting looking briefcase or package in a vehicle that has been
stopped for a traffic violation."' 5 The Court's ruling in Belton, he added,
authorized "broader vehicle searches than any neutral magistrate could
authorize by issuing a warrant.'15 6
Justices Brennan and Marshall sharply attacked the majority's "arbi-
trary 'bright line' rule" because it ignored the "underlying policy justifica-
tions" supporting the Chimel doctrine.'5 7 Justice Brennan reminded the
Court of the well settled rule that exceptions to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement are narrowly construed, so that warrantless intru-
150. 101 S. Ct. at 2865 (citing Arkansas v. Saunders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.11 (1979)).
151. 101 S. Ct. at 2865.
152. Id. at 2865 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See also Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. at
2851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
153. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2865, but sharply
criticized the Belton majority's expansion of the search incident to arrest exception. See
Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. at 2858-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. 101 S. Ct. at 2858. Justice Stevens feared that the police might use the Belton rule to
search vehicles incident to a mere traffic offense:
It is, of course, true that persons apprehended for traffic violations are frequently not
required to accompany the arresting officer to the police station before they are per-
mitted to leave on their own recognizance or by using their driver's licenses as a form
of bond. It is also possible that state law or local regulations may in some cases forbid
police officers from taking persons into custody for violation of minor traffic laws. As
a matter of constitutional law, however, any person lawfully arrested for the pettiest
misdemeanor may be temporarily placed in custody.
Id. As a practical matter, Justice Stevens noted that in some states the police officer can
make custodial arrests for violations of any motor vehicle law and that the traffic offender's
failure to produce bond will often result in custodial detention. Id. at 2858 n.12 (citations
omitted).
155. Id. at 2859.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sion is restricted in its scope by the exigent circumstances which justify
its inception.15 In Chimel, the exigent circumstances which compelled
the Court to carve out an exception to the warrant requirement were "the
safety of the arresting officer and the preservation of easily concealed or
destructible evidence."'15 9 But the Chimel exception, Justice Brennan de-
clared, "was narrowly tailored to address these concerns"' 60 and conse-
quently restricted the scope of the search incident to arrest to the arres-
tee's person and the area within his immediate control.""' Citing a litany
of prior decisions, Justice Brennan stated that the phrase "within his im-
mediate control" has always been construed "to mean the area from
within which he might gain possesson of a weapon or destructible evi-
dence."18 2 Such was not the case in Belton where the possibility of the
arrestees gaining possession of destructible evidence was non-existent.163
Once the arrestee is safely in custody, so that weapons or evidence cannot
be reached, the justifications underlying the Chimel exception cease to
exist.'" Belton and the three other occupants were removed from the car
and placed under arrest before the search was begun. But for the legal
fiction adopted by the Belton majority-"that the interior of a car is al-
ways within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been
in the car"'16 -there would have been no grounds for arguing that any of
these men could have reached Belton's jacket on the car's backseat. Jus-
tice Brennan urged "that the crucial question under Chimel is not
whether the arrestee could ever have reached the area that was searched,
but whether he could have reached it at the time of arrest and search." e
In response to the Belton Court's desire to fashion a "bright line" rule
for law enforcement officers, Justice Brennan warned that "the mere fact
that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself jus-
tify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.' 6 7 Even so, the Belton major-
ity's "bright line" rule, according to Brennan, failed to provide a more
efficient and workable solution. Belton did not indicate how much time
may elapse after the occupant has been removed from the car and ar-
158. Id. at 2866 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
159. Id. at 2866 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). But see Robin-
son v. United States, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (police officer's authority to search stems from
lawful custodial arrest and not from probability of discovering weapons or destructible
evidence).
160. 101 S. Ct. at 2866.
161. Id. at 2866-67.
162. Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 762-63).
163. 101 S. Ct. at 2867.
164. Id. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 764 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
165. 101 S. Ct. at 2867.
166. Id. at 2868 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2869 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)).
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rested before a search of the passenger compartment becomes illegal.'"
Would it matter whether the police had probable cause to arrest the oc-
cupant before or after the driver was removed from the car?"69 Also, was
there any reason why Belton's new search incident to arrest rule should
apply solely to automobile searches? 70 Questions may also arise as to
what constitutes the interior passenger compartment, which is subject to
warrantless intrusion, as compared to exterior or trunk compartments to
which Belton does not apply.2
7 1
Justice White's brief dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, criticized the
Belton majority for its "extreme extension of Chimel.' 2 Also, Justice
White emphasized that Belton could not be squared with Chadwick and
Sanders since the latter two cases held that closed containers, such as
suitcases and footlockers, are repositories for personal effects, manifesting
an expectation of privacy regardless of their location. 7 3 In the wake of
Belton, however, suitcases and other locked containers are vulnerable to
warrantless intrusion by virtue of their location in the passenger compart-
ment of a vehicle whose occupants are under custodial arrest.'
7 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Chadwick rejected the use of the search incident to arrest exception as
a justification for a warrantless container search. The Chadwick Court
could have done so solely on the basis that the footlocker search was not
"contemporaneous" with the drug couriers' arrests. Yet Chadwick fur-
nished another reason why the search incident to arrest exception did not
apply by reaffirming Chimel's limitation on the scope of such searches.
The determination of whether a container is "within the arrestee's im-
mediate control" depends upon a realistic assessment of the arrestee's
ability, at the time of the search, to obtain weapons or evidence from the
container. Once the container is secured by the police and the arrestee is
separated from the container so as to deny him access to its contents, the
168. 101 S. Ct. at 2869.
169. Id.
170. Id. A policeman engaged in surveilance of a house could have probable cause to be-
lieve a crime was committed within. Why is the policeman prevented from arresting the
occupant outside his house and escorting him back into the house and searching the house
incident to the occupant's arrest?
171. Station wagons and hatchbacks have luggage compartments, which, although func-
tioning as trunks, may be reached from the interior passenger compartment. What would
have been the result in Robbins if the state had argued the search incident to arrest excep-
tion? Would the station wagon's luggage compartment be a "trunk" so that the Belton rule
does not apply? Or would it be part of the interior passenger compartment which may be
searched incident to the custodial arrest of the vehicle's occupants?
172. 101 S. Ct. at 2870 (White, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. See note 5 supra.
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container is no longer within the arrestee's immediate control according
to the decisions in Chimel and Chadwick.
The Court's holding in Belton cannot be reconciled with Chadwick or
Chimel, and it represents a gross distortion of the search incident to ar-
rest exception. With the vehicle's occupants removed from the car prior
to the vehicle search, there was no possibility that the cocaine could have
been removed from Belton's black leather jacket. The decision fashions a
new rule: if, just before the arrest, a container sits in the passenger com-
partment of a vehicle, the container remains within the immediate con-
trol of the vehicle's occupants, who, having been placed under custodial
arrest, are outside the vehicle when it is searched. According to this rule,
the location of the container in relation to the arrestee at the time of the
search is unimportant. So long as the container may be found in the pas-
senger compartment, it may be searched without a warrant.
Belton's reliance on Robinson for its summary disregard of the Chimel
limitation on the scope of the search incident to arrest was misplaced. In
Robinson the Court was not faced with the problem of determining what
constituted the area within the arrestee's immediate control. Rather, the
issue was whether a policeman, incident to a lawful custodial traffic ar-
rest, could search the arrestee's person, when it was unlikely that the ar-
restee was carrying weapons or criminal evidence. Robinson stated that
courts should not second guess the arresting officer's decision to search
and that the officer's authority to search stems from the lawful custodial
arrest, and does not depend upon the likelihood of the arrestee having
weapons or evidence in his possession.
However, Robinson did not change Chimel's limitation that the arrest-
ing officer can only search the arrestee's person and the area within the
arrestee's immediate control. Robinson did not dispense with a reasoned
judgment by courts and law enforcement officers regarding the lawful
scope of a search incident to arrest. Robinson was no obstacle to Chad-
wick's rejection of a search incident to arrest once the container and vehi-
cle's occupants are separated and under the exclusive control of the po-
lice. Thus, the Belton majority seemed more concerned about developing
a "bright line" rule for a police manual, than it was in protecting privacy
rights or following established precedent.
Sanders ruled out the possibility of applying the automobile exception
to containers inside automobiles by distinguishing the legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in luggage as repositories for personal effects from the "di-
minished expectation of privacy" in automobiles. The Court's emphasis
on the special nature of luggage in both Chadwick and Sanders suggests
that different types of containers are entitled to varying degrees of pro-
tection under the fourth amendment. Robbins' "closed, opaque
container" rule seems inconsistent in this respect. However, the Sanders
footnote, which states that not all containers deserve full fourth amend-
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ment protection (since some containers betray their contents) suggests
that the Court contemplated application of the Sanders warrant require-
ment to searches of other containers in addition to luggage.
The Robbins decision did not deviate significantly from Sanders. It was
simply a logical extention of the Sanders reasoning that by placing effects
in a closed, opaque container, one manifests a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the container's contents, unless, because of the nature of the
container, the contents may be inferred from their outward appearance.
The Supreme Court apparently is making an effort to clarify the con-
fusing law of automobile searches. While this effort is to be commended,
it seems questionable that the law of automobile searches can be reduced
to simpler formulae and "bright line" rules. A far greater concern is the
price, in terms of fourth amendment protection, that must be paid in ex-
change for greater police efficiency.
James M. McCauley
ADDENDUM
After this comment was written and as it was going to print, the Su-
preme Court of the United States announced its decision in United
States v. Ross' in which a majority composed of five Justices2 upheld
warrantless searches of containers found in the trunk of a suspected drug
dealer's automobile.
There was no question that the police had probable cause to believe
that a search of the suspect's vehicle would produce narcotics. A proven
reliable informant had told the police that an individual known as "Ban-
dit" was dealing heroin out of his automobile trunk and had just com-
pleted a sale. The informant gave the police a description of the automo-
bile, its owner, and its location, which proved accurate.3 At an opportune
moment, two detectives arrested the dealer/owner, searched the trunk of
his automobile, and found a closed paper "lunch type" bag containing
glassine envelopes of a white powdered substance which was later found
to be heroin.4 At the police station, a second warrantless search of the
trunk produced a zippered leather pouch which contained $3,200 in cash.
At the trial of Ross for possession of heroin with intent to distribute,
1. 50 U.S.L.W. 4580 (June 1, 1982).
2. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined.




the district court denied a motion to suppress the evidence produced by
these searches.5 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
versed, relying on Sanders and finding that Ross had exhibited a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the contents of both containers. The court of
appeals refused to consider the paper bag a container unworthy of fourth
amendment protection as against the leather pouch, and concluded that
the contents of both containers could not be searched without a warrant.
With Justice Stevens writing for the majority, the United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that when the police have probable cause to be-
lieve an automobile on the highway is carrying contraband, the police
may stop the vehicle and search its contents, including all closed contain-
ers, locked or unlocked, without first procuring a warranty.
The majority distinguished this case from Robbins, Sanders, and
Chadwick factually in that the police did not have probable cause to be-
lieve that the automobiles in those earlier decisions were carrying narcot-
ics. The focus was on the containers found within the vehicle and not the
vehicle itself. Unlike the earlier decisions, Ross gave the Court a factual
setting where the police suspecteed contraband was in the vehicle prior to
stopping it and, because of this, the Ross search fit squarely within the
Carroll automobile exception.8
The Ross majority then rejected the Robbins plurality's reasoning that
a closed, opaque container could be indicative of a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the container's contents.9 The Ross majority stated that the
type of container should not determine the scope of the search; rather,
the scope of the search should be based upon the reasonable likelihood
that the area or place searched will contain the items for which the police
are searching.'0 Thus, while a brown paper bag is not a likely repository
for a 12-gauge shotgun, it is a reasonable place to search for narcotics,
and if the police have probable cause to suspect that the automobile is
carrying narcotics, the paper bag located in the car's trunk is subject to
search without a warrant.
The majority concluded that a valid vehicle search under the automo-
bile exception can be as broad in scope as a full-blown search conducted
5. Id.
6. A three-judge panel of the court of appeals concluded initially that the warrantless
search of the paper bag was valid, but the warrantless search of the leather pouch was not,
relying on Arkansas v. Sanders. Then the entire court of appeals decided to rehear the case
en banc and struck down both searches finding no distinction of constitutional significance
between the paper bag and the leather pouch. Ross v. United States, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161(D.C. Cir. 1981).
7. 50 U.S.L.W. 4588.
8. Id. at 4586.
9. Id. at 4587-88.
10. Id. at 4587.
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pursuant to a magistrate's warrant." The substitution of a police officer's
judgment for that of a neutral and detached magistrate's in the factual
setting presented in Ross was a disturbing prospect to Justice Marshall
who wrote a lengthy and vigorous dissent.12 Praising the long established
judicial preference for a magistrate's determination of probable cause,
Justice Marshall criticized the Ross majority for failing to limit the scope
of the automobile exception to the exigencies that justified its incep-
tion-where the vehicle's actual mobility made it impractical to obtain a
warrant.
The beauty of the Ross decision is that it should do away with the
senseless distinctions drawn between various sorts of containers, some of
which warranted fourth amendment protection under the Sanders-Rob-
bins approach, and others which did not. In announcing its new rule,
however, the Court seems to be moving away from what was once re-
garded as an inviolate principle of fourth amendment law-that excep-
tions to the warrant requirement are to be narrowly construed.
11. Id. at 4588.
12. Id. (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting.).
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